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Abstract: The primary goal of all organizations worldwide is to reduce potential threats and vulnerabilities. An 
information security control assessment is a far-reaching way to deal with control analysis that can help organizations 
to measure the adequacy and effectiveness of their present and planned security controls. Availability of adequate 
resources and proper risk analysis practices should be considered in preventing security breaches in order to achieve 
returns on security investments. Nonetheless, and despite the necessity for a competent security analysis framework, 
present frameworks and methodologies for security control analysis lack practical guidelines and mostly depend on 
subjective judgment and qualitative approaches. This paper proposes an information security control prioritization (ISCP) 
model that can determine the critical vulnerable controls based on a number of assessment criteria. The model uses 
techniques from the Order Performance by Similarity to Ideal Solution (TOPSIS) method, which is a sub-method of 
multiple attribute decision making. The proposed model provides clear guidelines on how to accomplish control analysis 
in a structured, self-organizing and constituent manner, with minimal overlap. Evaluation of information security 
controls using TOPSIS as the prioritization method involves a cost-effectiveness analysis, an effective and efficient 
assessment in terms of testing and selecting information security controls in organizations. 
 
Keywords: Information Security, Security Controls Assessment, Attribute Decision Making, Prioritization Model, 
TOPSIS, Critical Vulnerable Controls 
1. Introduction  
With the emergence of technology for conducting electronic business, organizations are increasingly relying on 
information systems and Information Technology (IT) assets to create new opportunities and enhance their current 
business. According to [3], when IT and technology play substantial roles in businesses and organizations, they should 
focus on information security. Aside from protecting organizations and their IT assets from loss and destruction, 
information security also ensures the Confidentiality, Integrity, Availability and Accountability (CIAA) of their 
resources [3]. Information security experts encourage organizations to conduct an Information Security Risk 
Assessment (ISRA) to protect the CIAA of business resources and their assets. Such precautions would help 
organizations to preserve their assets and achieve their business objectives [4]. 
In performing risk assessment, Singh in [5] proposed four steps: (1) identify the controls to be tested; (2) test the 
efficacy of these controls; (3) analyze the test results; and (4) recommend security enhancements based on the analysis. 
Research on risk assessment is gaining increasing attention from academic and business sectors. However, the crucial 
part of IT risk assessment has not received sufficient attention [6]. In fact, implementation of control risk management has 
been an ambiguous issue over the past few years [7]. Many risk analysis methodologies and models have proposed 
various approaches to solve these issues. Previous studies attempted to enhance security decisions by using either 
quantitative or qualitative modelling techniques [8]. Unfortunately, these risk assessment models remain inadequate, 
because previous research did not consider decision-making criteria and the cost effectiveness of the analysis. 
Information Security Controls (ISC), such as firewalls, routers, operating systems and databases, are technology 
solutions that mitigate risks to an acceptable level. 
 
As the risk assessment process is important, several models have been proposed to improve the methodology. Although 
these methods help to provide a business process and general approach, they do not offer clear practical guidelines, and 
their selection is based on expert opinion and subjective judgment. This lack of objective quantitative practical guidelines 
affects the prioritization and analysis of vulnerable assets and controls. This paper contributes the successful design of an 
ISCP model. The design closed the literature identified gaps of existing ISRA methods. The model helps decision makers 














A prioritization model is proposed to evaluate and select critical vulnerable information security controls for ISRA, 
providing clear guidelines on how a structured, self-organizing and adaptive risk assessment can be accomplished. The 
aim of the model is to reduce the extensive use of resources in terms of cost and time, and to optimize control 
assessment. The model uses Multiple Attribute Decision Making (MADM) to prioritize critical control criteria, such as 
threats, severity and cost impact. It provides organizations with the best possible option by allowing them to select and 
implement critical controls based on their own constraints and budget. The remainder of the paper is organized as 
follows: the related work on ISC assessment is presented first, followed by a description of the information security 
control prioritization (ISCP) model and its results. The proposed model is then discussed in detail. Finally, the 
conclusion of the study and directions for future work are provided. 
2. Related Work 
This section reviews the literature on ISC in organizations. A great body of work on risk management process is 
available, including studies by standards organizations, academic institutions and industry bodies, such as [1], National 
Institute of Standard and Technology (NIST SP 800-30) [2], Operationally Critical Threat, Asset and Vulnerability 
Evaluation (OCTAVE) [9], Information Risk Analysis Methodology (IRAM) [10], Expression of Needs, CCTA Risk 
Analysis and Management Method (CRAMM) [11] and Identification of Security Objectives (EBIOS) [12]. Although 
these models assist organizations in performing risk management, most of them focus on defining risk management 
processes rather than identifying optimal controls for organizations’ resources. 
Traditional risk management models did not endorse any effective assessment, control prioritization or implementation 
of the most effective controls that are suitable to a particular organization. Lv et al. [13] proposed multi-criteria 
selection models based on a number of dataset requirements. However, these models do not pay attention to the fact 
that the problem of control ranking is a group decision problem in which subjective and objective judgments of the 
results must be available to provide better ranking of security controls. 
 
Controls should be evaluated according to weighted selected criteria and not only on control weighting., but no results 
of the security control ranking of these models has been reported. As these models are still at the proposal stage, further 
study is required to prove and validate this approach. Existing ISC frameworks can be used as a basis for risk 
evaluation in organizations. 
 
Frameworks such as NIST SP 8-30, OCTAVE, IRAM, CRAMM and EBIOS provide information on how to reduce 
risk by implementing liability security controls, such as Control Objectives for IT and Available Technology (COBIT 
4.1) [14], Sys Admin and Network Security (SANS) (SANS, 201), ISO 27001 and Information Technology 
Infrastructure Library (ITIL) [15]. Many studies focus on risk management processes from standards organizations, 
academic groups and industry bodies. The frameworks and models listed above define the risk management process and serve 
as effective references. However, they reduce the risk management programme to a mere checklist. Although these 
frameworks seem excellent in theory, most do not provide clear guidelines on how to accomplish control security assessment. 
The following subsections summarize the existing ISC frameworks and models. 
 
2.1 ISO/IEC 27005 
ISO/IEC [1] (see Fig. 1) provides guidelines for Information Security Risk Management (ISMS) in an organization. 
These guidelines give particular support to the requirements specified in ISO/IEC 27001, designed to assist the 
implementation of risk management. In this process, the background is first established. Then, the risks are assessed 
through a risk treatment plan in order to effectively implement recommended control and decisions. The standard 
attempts to identify the actual sources of particular risks before deciding what can be done, and when. The main 
objective of this standard is to reduce risks to an acceptable level. Despite being a generic guideline for managing risks, 
ISO 27005 does not obviously outline a proper analysis of current controls [5]. It fails to give granular guidance on the key 
steps of critical control identification, and qualitative data are used for analysis. In addition, selecting ISC from common 
















2.2 Risk Management Guide for Information Technology Systems (NIST SP 800-30) 
 
NIST SP 800-30 is a guide issued by NIST for the development of a risk management programme, primarily for US 
government sectors [2, 16]. It contains practical guidelines and definitions necessary for developing effective risk 
management programmes within existing IT systems. Its main goal is to help organizations manage risks more 
effectively within their IT resources. 
The NIST risk management guide assists IT managers to reduce operational costs and achieve revenue by minimizing 
loss that results from IT failure. The risk assessment framework consists of nine primary steps or activities, as 
illustrated in Fig. 2. 
 
The NIST guideline highlights risk assessment and risk mitigation as two critical components. In the risk assessment 
process, control analysis (step four) does not provide granular guidance on how control analysis should be conducted, 
unlike ISO 27005 [5]. Its risk assessment process is based on the organization’s subjective judgment [17] rather than 
objective evaluation. No further guidance, particularly on how controls should be selected for testing purposes, is 
provided [18, 19].  
Nor does it consider the specific constraints, such as costs, scheduling and resources, experienced by each organization 
[3], which suggests that expertise is necessary in selecting the best and critical controls. The key risk assessment steps 
 















are conducted qualitatively, although many organizations do not use qualitative analysis, preferring the quantitative 
approach, particularly through intelligent decision support systems. 
 
2.3 OCTAVE 
OCTAVE is a suite of tools, techniques and methods for risk-based information security strategic assessment and 
planning [20]. The OCTAVE concept was published by the Software Engineering Institute of Carnegie Mellon 
University in 1999 and was formalized into the OCTAVE criteria in [21]. The method and plan-development phase in 
risk management are covered in the OCTAVE strategy, which includes risks to critical assets, protection strategy, risk 
measures and risk mitigation plans. The basic requirements of the OCTAVE approach are materialized in a set of 
criteria. Several methods, such as OCTAVE methodology and OCTAVE-S, were developed specifically for these 
criteria. [11, 22]. 
OCTAVE is reportedly more effective than NIST and ISO 27005 in providing prescriptive guidance. It details risk 
management instead of only the process framework [5]. However, it focuses on qualitative risk determination. Risk 
assessment has obviously shifted towards the need for quantitative information, which would more accurately help in 
 















the decision-making process of organization leaders [23]. OCTAVE is also known to depend on expert analysis in 
determining the critical controls and related risks. When more people are involved, analysis becomes more subjective 
[18, 24]. Qualitative data analysis and team-subjective factors may result in an inaccurate and ambiguous output [25]. 
 
2.4 IRAM 
IRAM [10] is a proprietary methodology available in the Information Security Forum. It uses business influence 
analysis approaches to risk analysis. It is geared towards assessing the influence of potential security breaches on 
business, assessing threats and vulnerabilities, determining information risks, identifying and analyzing control 
requirements and generating an action plan to address the identified control requirements. The IRAM control selection 
is conducted through qualitative interviews of all stakeholders and business owners. As mentioned earlier, human 
judgments are always subjective and vary among individuals, and may thus result in inaccurate risk assessment [23, 
24]. However, the goal of risk analysis is to minimize the subjective factors; risk analysis based on quantitative 
measurements facilitates accurate decision making [23]. 
 
2.5 EBIOS 
EBIOS [12] is a comprehensive set of guidelines for information system risk managers. It was originally launched by 
the French government but is now supported by a team of experts of diverse origins. It produces common practices and 
application documents targeted to end users in various contexts, and yields critical IT security standards [18]. Although 
EBIOS suggests common practices and identifies controls by formalizing security objectives, it does not have clear 
guidelines on how to accomplish these objectives in a structured manner [26]. Similar to IRAM, EBIOS depends on self-
judgment or expert opinion. Several risk assessment methods rely on subjective inputs by human experts. As stressed in 
the preceding paragraphs, human judgment can be inconsistent, particularly in the contexts of uncertainty and risk [26]. 
2.6 CRAMM 
CRAMM is a risk analysis method developed by the Central Communication and Telecommunication Agency, a 
British government organization. It requires the use of a special tool. The first release of CRAMM (method and tool) 
was based on the best practices of British government organizations. CRAMM is the risk analysis method currently 
preferred by large organizations, such as government bodies and industries, in the United Kingdom [11]. The risk 
management tool is compliant with ISO standards to provide guidance for ISMS. Unfortunately, CRAMM depends 
solely on qualitative risk evaluation, which suggests that the results may be subjective and inaccurate [27]. 
3. Statistical Design of Experimental Approach 
As an alternative to the qualitative approach of the models described above, Stoneburner et al. in [19] proposed the 
statistical design of experiments based on the Plackett and Burman model  [28], considering important aspects of 
risk assessment. 
 
The proposed model identifies and ranks security controls that are specifically important to an organization. Only the 
selected controls are tested. The advantage of this approach is that security control recommendations are based only on 
the nature of the threat and the cost important to the organization. However, the sum of the ranks used in assessing the 
risk is not suitable for evaluating the complexity of different evaluation criteria and is insufficient for calculating the 
approximate cases of ISC. This approach can be further enhanced as a decision-support system for control selection by 
increasing the number of criteria to achieve better results Organizations should be provided with risk severity details 
and the cost of remediation effort, which are not considered in this model.  
 
3.1 Multi-Criteria Evaluation Methods 
Lv et al. [29] developed a multi-criteria evaluation method, which quantitatively ranks the available risk controls 
with the help of PROMETHEE methodology and Geometrical Analysis for Interactive Assistance (GAIA) plane. 














This model does not consider control ranking as a group decision problem in which the subjective and objective 
judgments must be available to achieve the accurate ranking of controls. The control weight and the preferred functions 
are identified by expert opinion prior to analysis. Cyber investment analysis methodology was proposed by Lianso [13]. 
A data-driven approach for selecting and prioritizing security controls was used as a framework in ranking the security 
controls, based on the dataset extracted from previous experiments and control effectiveness scoring. This methodology 
consists of multiple steps, prioritizing the controls based primarily on their effectiveness score. However, in setting the 
security controls, the weighting is computed according to expert opinion on security control capabilities, that is on 
expert observations on the effectiveness of controls. A clear classification of the dataset, which would indicate how the 
data are estimated and analyzed, is unavailable. 
3.2 ISCP Model 
The limitations of the existing risk assessment models were discussed in the previous sections. In general, the major 
limitation is the qualitative approach, which is unpopular with decision makers. Therefore, a quantitative approach, 
namely, the prioritization model, is proposed to improve the overall risk assessment process. The proposed model and 
its components are described in the succeeding paragraphs. The model aims to improve ISC assessment by analyzing 
multiple evaluation criteria, such as vulnerability, weakness, attack severity and cost of remediation effort of the 
organization. The model consists of three main stages, namely, (1) control aggregation, (2) control assessment, and (3) 
control analysis. The output of the control aggregation stage is a list of the evaluation criteria used to determine the 
value of the information assets, potential consequences and scope of the risk assessment activity. Similarly, the output 
of the control assessment stage is a real experiment with raw data driven from risk exposure, consisting of valid threats 
attaching to the identified vulnerabilities. The purpose of the last stage, control analysis, is to correlate all the findings, 
filter all the inputs, and validate the data into a readable view by applying MADM. These three stages can help 
organizations in selecting and analyzing appropriate controls for their IT resources. This model helps decision makers 
to select the most effective and most vulnerable controls in resource-constrained environments. Fig. 3 describes the 





















A case study is used to demonstrate the ISCP model clearly. It was conducted in an SME in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, 
following the three stages of the prioritization model.  This enterprise was an Internet security consulting company with 
fewer than 250 employees. A three-person internal audit team was responsible for risk assessment, and the organization 
complied with ISO 27001 and 27002 standards for conducting risk assessment. 
 
3.2.1 Control Aggregation 
This phase identified all the information regarding the security controls, such as test scope, threats aligned with 
controls and control evaluation criteria. Control aggregation consists of three steps, as follows: 
A. Control Determination 
The scope and infrastructure barriers of the security controls are determined, classified into technical and non-technical 
controls. Technical control is known as safeguards that are built into the hardware and software to mitigate risks. This 
model is primarily concerned with technical controls, such as routers, firewalls, wireless access points and servers. 
 
B. Threat Classification 
Table 1 shows the seven types of threat considered in the model [5]. These threats will be used for identifying the gaps 
of the current controls of the organization’s infrastructure and for testing purposes. Each threat is described with the 
possible attacks. In this research, our test focused on the Web environment. The threat classification was adapted from 
the definition provided by the Web Application Security Consortium [30], which described threat classification as a 
cooperative effort to clarify and organize threats to website security. 
C. Business Impact Determination 
In this step, the degree of the threats for the affected controls were specified in terms of the following 
characteristics: 
 
 Vulnerabilities: The total number of possible vulnerabilities that might damage the particular controls. 
 Valid vulnerabilities: Vulnerabilities are not always weaknesses. Thus, the total number of weaknesses should 
be considered in evaluating the particular controls. 
 Exploit attacks: The attack types and classification are the main factors considered in evaluating the particular 
controls (refer to Table 1 for more detail)  
 Attack severity: Damage or consequences to the organization caused by the attacks are identified based on the 
DREAD criteria (damage potential, reproducibility, exploitability, affected users and discoverability) [31]. 
DREAD is a popular classification scheme for quantifying, comparing and prioritizing the attacks presented by 
each evaluated threat. Each category was divided into four levels to describe the level of attack: critical, high, 
medium and low. Each finding was assigned a composite severity score and the severity was calculated by adding 
each of the DREAD components, thereby producing a number between 1 and 50. Table 2 illustrates the severity 
scores 
 Remediation effort level: The cost level of the remediation effort required to rectify the identified vulnerabilities 
was determined. The remediation levels were divided into three categories, namely, high, medium and low. Table 3 
shows the cost remediation levels for the related threats. 
 
3.2.2 Control Assessment 
In this stage, a test was set up and data were collected for the particular controls. There are three steps, which are 
explained as follows: 
A. Vulnerability Assessment 
Vulnerability assessment is the process of identifying, quantifying and prioritizing known vulnerabilities to fix the 
threat, to prevent a compromise, or to apply a patch. Internal and external scans are performed to detect security 
vulnerabilities across the entire infrastructure before such vulnerabilities are exploited by an attacker. The entire 














B. Vulnerability Analysis 
All redundant data from different vulnerability assessment tools are combined to create one formal result for all 
findings. The identified vulnerabilities were verified to minimize false positives, vulnerability duplication by 
different tools and errors during the test. 
C. Penetration Testing 
Penetration testing (also called pen testing) is the process of testing a computer system or network to find valid 
vulnerabilities that an attacker could exploit. Vulnerabilities are the greatest risks to the computing environment and 
penetration testing reveals risks that need priority fixing. The objectives depend on the type of pen test performed. 
Penetration testing has two types, namely, internal or external. 
 
Table 1. Threat classification [5] 
Class Attacks 
Authentication “Brute Force, Insufficient Authentication, Weak Password Recovery, Validation Server 
 Misconfiguration, Application Misconfiguration, Insufficient Password”. 
Authorization “Credential/Session Prediction, Insufficient Authorization, Insufficient Session Expiration, Session 
 Fixation, Eavesdropping, Command Authorization Bypass”. 
Client-side attacks “Content Spoofing, Cross-site Scripting”. 
Command execution “Buffer Overflow, Format String Attack, LDAP Injection, OS Command Injection, SQL Injection, 
 SSI Injection, Xpath Injection, Improper Output Handling, Denial of Service”. 
Information disclosure “Directory Indexing, Information Leakage, Path Traversal, Predictable Resource Location, Fingerprinting”. 
Logical attacks “Abuse of Functionality, Insufficient Anti-automation, Insufficient Process Validation, Worms”. 
Insider attacks “Transfer of Confidential Data, Access of Prohibited Content, Access to Isolated Sub-nets, Output Redirection”. 
 
Table 2. Severity score [31] 
Severity rating DREAD score Risk description 
Critical (7) 40 to 50 “A critical finding should be considered immediately for review and resolution. 
  Exploitation of critical vulnerabilities is relatively easy and can lead directly to an attacker 
  gaining privileged access (root or administrator) to the system. Findings with this risk rating 
  pose risks that could negatively influence business operations or business continuity”. 
Severe (5) 25 to 39 “A severe finding should be considered for review and resolution within a short time frame. 
  These vulnerabilities lead to an attacker gaining non-privileged access (standard user) to a 
   system, or the vulnerability leveraged to gain elevated level of access”. 
Moderate (3) 11 to 24 “A moderate finding should be considered once the critical and severe findings have been 
  addressed. These vulnerabilities leak sensitive data that an attacker can use to assist in the 
   exploitation of other vulnerabilities. Moderate findings do not pose a substantial threat to 
   business operations”. 
Low (1) 1 to 10 A low finding should not be considered a moderate risk to the business. 
  These vulnerabilities are obscure and unlikely to be discovered 
 
Table 3. Cost remediation effort score [31] 
Effort rating Cost description 
High (5) Significant multi-resource effort that may span over a considerable amount of time;  
 requires a significant network architecture change or the purchase of additional security products 
Moderate (3) One to several days; requires moderate amount of resources 
Low (1) Less than a day; requires only a minimal amount of resources 
 
3.2.3 Control Analysis 
In the third stage, the model analyzes the data and makes recommendations to the decision makers. It consists of two 
steps: 
A. Group Result Analysis 
Result estimation focuses on analyzing the findings in varying degrees of detail depending on the criticality of controls 
and DREAD rating level. Given the availability of the resulting data, quantitative analysis methods were used, 
employing a scale with numerical values for both severity and remediation effort levels. The quality of the analysis 
depended on the accuracy and completeness of the numerical values, as well as the validity of the findings. The 














the results and the system rating, which resulted in subjective judgments. The results for each security control were 
analyzed and evaluated by four security experts for vulnerability assessment and by using the pen test to estimate the 
attack severity and the cost of remediation effort in mitigating these attacks. The attack severity and cost remediation 
effort scores were used to calculate the influence of the experimental data, as illustrated in Tables 2 and 3. 
B. Multi-Control Decision Making 
MADM was encountered in various situations, such as when a number of decision makers had several alternatives and 
when actions had to be selected based on a set of attributes [7]. MADM was conducted to prioritize and select the 
critical technical controls based on the estimation data of the group of experts. According to the type of information 
provided by the decision makers, MADM can be classified into: no information, information on the attribute and 
information on alternatives [7, 32]. Focus was on the type in which the decision makers provide information on the 
attribute. Therefore, the Technique for Order Performance by Similarity to Ideal Solution (TOPSIS) method was 
employed. In any multiple-attribute decision-making ranking, a number of fundamental terms, such as the Decision 
Matrix (DM), the Evaluation Matrix (EM), the alternatives and the criteria, have to be defined. EM consists of m 
alternatives and n criteria that have to be created. By considering the intersection of each alternative and criteria as xij, we 
obtain the matrix (xij)m*n: 
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                                                         (1) 
where, A1, A2,…,Am are possible alternatives from which decision makers have to choose (i.e. technical security 
controls); C1, C2,…,Cn are criteria by which alternative performance is measured (i.e. vulnerability, threat, valid 
vulnerability, severity, cost remediation effort); and xij is the rating of the alternative Ai with respect to criterion Cj. Wj is 
the weight of criterion Cj and should thus be equal to 1. A number of processes, such as normalization, maximization 
indicator and adding the weights, must be performed to rank the alternatives. 
4. TOPSIS Method 
Step 1: Constructing the Normalized Decision Matrix 
In this process, various attribute dimensions are transformed into non-dimensional attributes, thereby allowing a 
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Step 2: Constructing the Weighted Normalized Decision Matrix 
A set of weights w = w1, w2, w3,…,wj,…wn from the decision maker is accommodated in this process in order to 
normalize the decision matrix. Each column from the normalized decision matrix (R) can be multiplied by its 
associated weight wj in order to get the resulting matrix. The following set of weights is equal to 1: 
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Step 3: Determining the Ideal and Negative Ideal Solutions 
Two artificial alternatives A
*
 (the ideal alternative) and A
-
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where J is a subset of {i = 1,2,…,m} that represents “the size, robustness and complexity”. J
-
 is the complement set of 
J, noted as J
c
, referring to the set of cost attributes. 
Step 4: Separation Measurement Calculation Based on Euclidean Distance 
Calculating the distance between each alternative in V and the ideal vector A
*
 using the Euclidean distance is given by: 







S = v - v , i = 1,2,...m

                                                                 (8) 
 
Likewise, the calculation of separation measurement for each alternative in V from the negative ideal A
-
 is given as: 
 





i- ij jS = v - v , i = 1,2,...m

                                                              (9) 
Eventually in Step 4, two values, namely, Si* and Si-, were counted for each alternative. These represent the distance of 
each alternative from the ideal. 
Step 5: Ideal Solution Calculation Closeness 
Ai closeness to the ideal solution A
*
 is calculated as: 
 
   * - - * *i i i i iC = S S + S ,0 < C <1, i = 1/ ,2,...m                                                 (10) 
 
Where Ci* = 1 once only (Ai = A
*
). Then, Ci* = 0 once (Ai = A
-
). 
Step 6: Alternatives Ranking based on Closeness to the Ideal Solution 
Alternative Ai rank according to the descendant order of Ci*; a higher value corresponds to better performance. 
5. Results 
This section shows the results obtained from a test conducted in the organization as specified in the section on the ISCP 
model. The paper only shows one case study testing the newly proposed ISCP model because in the risk assessment 
field, publishing results or data about an organization’s position and assets is not encouraged, as they do not want to 
share confidential or sensitive information and the limited scope of the experiment. The prioritization model was 
employed in conducting the risk assessment for the organization. One of the researchers and a group of experts with 














conducted according to the phases of the model. First, the scope and infrastructure boundaries of the security controls 
were determined, categorized as technical or non-technical controls. This study evaluates the technical information 
security controls. 
Stage 1: Control Aggregation 
It is important to mention that all tests were conducted in a real network setting. First, 18 technical security controls 
were identified (as in Table 4). Then, the attacks were classified into more than seven classes based on the type of 
organization. Finally, the evaluation criteria have been identified earlier and summarized as shown in Table 4.   
Stage 2: Control Assessment 
The goal of this stage is to test the strengths and weaknesses of the security controls. The research started with the first 
evaluation criterion, which identifies vulnerabilities as shown in Table 5.  
Identified open source tools to determine the vulnerabilities for the technical controls has been utilized; Nessus, Nmap, 
Dumpsec, Kismet and Acunetix Web Vulnerability Scanner were used. Over 50 tests were conducted to identify the 
vulnerabilities according to the seven classes identified in Table 1. The researchers ran the assessment for all security 
controls and altogether 527 vulnerabilities were identified. Then based on the identified research classes, the team 
verified the attacks based on the technical control’s type and function. Table 6 illustrates the attack classes used. 
Table 4.  Business Impact Criteria 
Known vulnerabilities  
Valid vulnerabilities  
Attack class 
Severity  
Remediation effort level 
 
Table 5. Identified known vulnerabilities by Expert 1 
No Technical Security Controls 
1 Router 
2 Firewall 
3 Web Application 
4 Web server 
5 DHCP Server 
6 Active Directory 
7 CCTV Server 
8 File server 
9 Antivirus Server 
10 Database 
11 Active Mail Server 
12 Windows Update Server 
13 Vmware ESX Server 
14 Passive Mail Server 
15 Wireless AP 
16 E-mail Gateway 
17 DNS 















Stage 3: Control Analysis 
In this stage, the attack severity, threat classes, along with the cost of remediation effort were evaluated, as shown in 
Tables 2 and 3. The data were validated prior to analysis to obtain accurate result estimations. Severity estimation 
assigns values to the consequences of a risk from low to critical. The estimation of cost and remediation effort were 
conducted through group analysis and expert evaluation. The last step in this stage is validating the vulnerabilities 
identified in the previous step, using penetration testing. The main objective of the penetration test is to demonstrate the 
impact of the encountered vulnerabilities, issues and risks. Then, over 100 tests were run using different penetration 
testing tools, Metasploit, AirSnort, Nstealth, Paros Proxy, ISS Database Scanner and Spike, to validate the data 
obtained from the vulnerability assessment. The results show fewer technical control vulnerabilities than in the findings 
identified in the first stage as shown in Table 7. Then the team ordered the output according to the classification of 
attacks exploiting the vulnerabilities. Attack classes were aligned and linked to each technical security control. Table 8 
shows the output of the attack classes that directly exploit the findings or vulnerabilities and Table 9 shows 
Remediation Effort Level.   
 
Table 7.  Identified known vulnerabilities by Expert 1 
Technical Security Controls Valid Vulnerabilities Ranking 
Router  27 9 
Firewall 3 18 
Web Application  96 1 
Web server  50 2 
DHCP Server 25 10 
Active Directory 23 13 
CCTV Server 33 14 
File server  27 8 
Antivirus Server  28 6 
Database 29 5 
Active Mail Server  33 4 
Windows Update Server  25 11 
VMware ESX Server  41 3 
Passive Mail Server  19 15 
Wireless AP 4 17 
E-mail Gateway 12 16 
DNS  28 7 
Development Server 24 12 
Total 527  
 
Table 8.  Identified valid vulnerabilities by Expert 1 
Table 6.  Threat Classifications 
Authentication 
Authorization  
Client-side attack  
Command execution  
Information disclosure  
















Technical Security Controls Valid Vulnerabilities Ranking 
Router  14 2 
Firewall 2 16 
Web Application  88 1 
Web server  14 3 
DHCP Server 5 11 
Active Directory 5 9 
CCTV Server 8 6 
File server  5 12 
Antivirus Server  5 8 
Database 7 7 
Active Mail Server  5 10 
Windows Update Server  4 15 
VMware ESX Server  8 5 
Passive Mail Server  9 4 
Wireless AP 1 17 
E-mail Gateway 1 18 
DNS  5 13 
Development Server 5 14 
Total 191  
 























Router  4 3 2 0 0 5 0 
Firewall 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Web Application  14 8 15 38 3 2 8 
Web server  4 6 2 2 0 0 0 
DHCP Server 0 4 0 0 1 0 0 
Active Directory 0 4 0 0 1 0 0 
CCTV Server 4 4 0 0 0 0 0 
File server  1 4 0 0 0 0 0 
Antivirus Server  3 2 0 0 0 0 0 
Database 2 4 0 1 0 0 0 
Active Mail Server  5 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Windows Update Server  4 0 0 0 0 0 0 














Passive Mail Server  2 3 0 0 4 0 0 
Wireless AP 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
E-mail Gateway 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
DNS  0 4 0 0 1 0 0 












Table 10. Remediation Effort Level Results of Expert 1 
Technical Security Controls  Critical  High  Moderate  Ranking  
Router  0  8  5  4  
Firewall  0  0  0  17  
Web application  3  80  4  1  
Web server  4  7  1  2  
DHCP server  0  4  0  14  
Active directory  0  4  0  13  
CCTV server  0  7  0  9  
File server  0  4  0  15  
Anti-virus server  0  4  0  12  
Database  0  6  0  10  
Active mail server  0  2  1  7  
Windows update server  0  3  0  16  
VMware ESX server  2  5  0  3  
Passive mail server  0  8  0  8  
wireless AP  1  0  0  6  
Email gateway  0  1  0  18  
DNS  1  3  0  5  















Finally, the results were analyzed by the TOPSIS method to achieve data prioritization. TOPSIS was programmed with 
Java to automate the analysis process. The resulting data were analyzed to rank the results and identify the vulnerable 
technical controls based on the evaluation criteria. Security controls were rated on a scale of 1 to 18 based on the 
maximum number of security controls, with 1 denoting the most critical risk and 18 denoting the lowest. The top eight 
critical risks of ISC to the organization were then selected. To validate and evaluate the proposed model, the 
researchers have compared the results of the proposed model with the ISO/IEC 27005 risk management method in 
similar scope. The ISO/IEC 27005 risk assessment method was chosen because not only is it applicable to all types of 
organization, but also the risk assessment process that would be the same for all other ISRA models. However, it was 
soon realized that a comparison of these results would be inconclusive because there was very little difference between 
the scopes of this methods and approaches. As a result, four experts from different reputable organizations who have 
experience in the field of ISRA were interviewed to evaluate the current behaviours of the proposed model compared to 
ISO/IEC 27005. This study had already investigated the challenges and shortcomings of the ISO/IEC 27005 risk 
assessment (see section 2 above). The success measurements factor such as risk assessment time, cost, uncertainty, and 
usefulness were used in the comparison between the ISCP model and ISO/IEC 27005 method, as shown in Table 13. 
The comparison results were examined based on the rating score (low, medium, high) [31]. The results of these scores 
for the ISCP model factors were revealed from the experts’ feedback during the interviews in order to assess the 
























Severity  Remediation 
Effort level  
Ranking  
Router  9 2 2  2  4  2  
Firewall  18 16 16  17  17 17 
Web application  1 1 1  1  1  1  
Web server  2 3 4  8 2 2 
DHCP server  10 11 6  14  14 11 
Active directory  13 9 7  13  13 14 
CCTV server  14 6 5  9  9 8 
File server  8 12 10  11  15 14 
Anti-virus server  6 8 11  12 12 12 
Database  5 7 9 4 10 4 
Active mail server  4 10 8  16 7 9  
Windows update 
server  
11 15 15  15 16 16 
VMware ESX server  3 5 14 10 3 6 
Passive mail server  15 4 3  3 8 5 
Wireless AP  17 17 17  7 6 15 
Email gateway  16 18 18  18 18  18 
DNS  7 13 12 6 5 7 


























It is important to mention that we have reported the result for the first expert in details, but the rest of the experts are 
summarized in Table 12. As previously stated, inaccurate selection and evaluation of ISC can result in inaccurate risk 
assessment. The ISCP model helps decision makers to decide which controls are critical or important and which threats 
to consider. The model was used to improve the risk assessment and achieve effective security decision making. Aside 
from risk assessment, understanding the critical security controls in an organization is important for other reasons. 
During the group analysis of the data, the experts had different opinions, so the results had to be compared again with 
TOPSIS (see Table 12). The table lists critical security controls which indicate that that the Web application had to be 
addressed with the highest priority, followed by the router, the Web server, the VMware ESX server, the Passive Mail 
server, the database, the CCTV server and the DHCP server. These controls were evaluated for the known 
vulnerabilities with different evaluation criteria, such as cost of remediation effort. Then the controls for each criterion 
were ranked using TOPSIS, as were the data estimated by the experts. 
Findings shows that firewall and wireless AP were considered as significant controls in the organization, suggesting 
that firewalls are most effective in countering attacks. Although there are several ISRA methods, there are some 
shortcomings and challenges. The ISCP model used the TOPSIS method to prioritize selection among all the results; 
however, the weighting steps within TOPSIS were unable to accommodate all the controls because of the lack of a 
benchmark for the importance of these assets to all organizations. In this study, the researchers had to set an equal 
weight and let the organization choose the best weight for the threats based on the criticality of the controls. The 
authors intended to compare the results of the case study with previous case study of risk assessment of similar scope. 
Table 13. Comparison between ISO/IEC 27005 and the ISCP model 
 
Factor ISO/IEC 27005 method ISCP model 
Assessment time High Low 
Assessment cost High Low 
                     Uncertainty Medium Low 
                     Usefulness Medium High 
 
Table 12. Ranking Summary of Expert 1 
Technical Security 
Controls  
Expert 1 Expert 2 Expert 3 Expert 4 Ranking 
Router  2 3 3 2 2 
Firewall  17 17 18 17 17 
Web application  1 1 1 1 1 
Web server  2 2 2 3 2 
DHCP server  11 11 7 10 9 
Active directory  14 13 11 9 12 
CCTV server  8 8 6 5 7 
File server  14 14 9 15 13 
Anti-virus server  12 12 13 11 12 
Database  4 4 4 8 5 
Active mail server  9 9 15 7 10 
Windows update server  16 16 14 14 15 
VMware ESX server  6 6 5 4 5 
Passive mail server  5 5 8 6 6 
Wireless AP  15 15 16 18 16 
Email gateway  18 18 17 16 17 
DNS  7 7 10 12 9 















However, it was soon realized that a comparison of these results would be inconclusive because there was very little 
difference between the methods and approach in the two scenarios. Although there are many ISRA methods, the 
literature reveals a lack of sufficient research focusing on developing or enhancing these existing methods [7, 32]]. The 
scores for the ISCP model factors were revealed from the feedback of the group of experts and the literature review, 
based on the rating score (low, medium, high). The ISCP model was compared with the ISO 27005 risk assessment 
method to measure its performance. The results showed better performance, as the ISCP model dramatically reduced 
the risk assessment time, cost and uncertainty. In contrast, the usefulness parameter of the proposed model increased. 
 
7. Conclusion 
The control assessment method is a vital step in information security risk management, providing continuous defense 
against threats. A limited number of researchers have studied risk assessment methods, and to gain further insight the 
present research has identified and clarified issues and challenges to existing methods. The current frameworks and 
methodologies do not give sufficient practical details on how to select and evaluate ISC. Furthermore, the assessment 
process requires that resource protection be conducted by the organization, which is difficult to realize with a limited 
budget and expertise. The proposed model enhances the risk assessment process through a multi- and dynamic 
evaluation model that assists organizations in evaluating ISC accurately. The model enables good security decision 
making throughout by considering the weight of each criterion in the organization. It helps the organization to identify 
only the critical vulnerable controls that need to be managed, and to identify the most effective or better-performing of 
all these security controls. 
In future, the data will be run using different multi-attribute decision-making methods, the results from this study 
compared with those from other methods to determine the most effective method. The model will be evaluated by 
expert’s similar industries to the organization in question.  
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